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ABSTRACT 
This article offers a critical engagement of Sir Quett Ketumile 
Masire’s eighteen years in power (1980–1998). Masire epitomises 
the kind of transformational political leadership that has sustained 
Botswana’s political stability since independence. By presenting a 
discussion of Masire’s political philosophy, his leadership style, and 
the underlying internal and external factors, the paper concludes 
by drawing lessons from his leadership style for the benefit of 
political leadership development in Africa. Most discussions about 
Botswana’s leadership, its philosophy and style tend to conclude 
that Botswana is a ‘citadel’ of democracy in Africa without 
providing details of the various political factors that have 
contributed to the country’s current configurations and its 
leadership style, which exists as a form of state capture. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
History is a clock that people use to tell their political 
and cultural time of day, it is also a compass that 
people use to find themselves on the map of human 
geography. History tells a people where they have 
been, what they have been, where they are and what 
they are. Most important, history tells a people where 
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they still must go, what they still must be. The 
relationship of people to history is the same as the 
relationship of a mother to her child (John Henrik 
Clarke, Film, 1996) 
 
The insurmountability and importance of the issues facing the 
African continent and her leadership are aptly captured in the 
above quote. The historical locus of annunciation of these issues 
cannot also be downplayed. A temptation arises for one to offer a 
rather ambitious and quite radical disclaimer that when discussing 
the challenges Africa faces as researchers, scholars, policymakers 
and other interested parties; it is questionable to present the 
continent as having a leadership deficit. Further, we are bidden not 
to completely ignore the dialectical link between Africa’s political 
leadership with the colonial past and its present global contra-
flows in line with geopolitics and, in particular, Global West 
politics, as imperial designs. It will be argued that, Africa is no 
tabula rasa nor is a stand-alone continent divorced from historical 
occurrences or recent events, and so any attempt to understand, 
and probably debate on African leadership must be done within a 
complex historical context of entanglements. In attempting to 
present this complex historical locus, Botswana will be used as a 
case study. 
 This article will further argue that the historicity of African 
political leadership and its continuous yearning for a more 
democratic landscape depicts Botswana as a ‘citadel’ of democracy 
in Africa, with President Ketumile Masire as a major actor in this 
political discourse. Focus will then be on, Sir Quett Ketumile Joni 
Masire, the man, and his leadership, which spun over a period of 
eighteen years as President, and even beyond. 
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INTERPRETING AFRICA’S MALAISE AND THE MYTH OF LEADERSHIP 
DEFICIT 
The thesis of a leadership deficit, let alone a crisis, as offered by 
the recent scramble to manage and manipulate Africa’s future 
leadership championed by different leadership institutions, 
organisations and foundations is a myth. Its spectacles and 
projections are a product of external definition and description of 
African scenarios devoid of the continent’s pronged 
entanglements, which include; precolonial narratives, colonial 
influence and postcolonial conjectures into the future. The 
paradox to Africa’s leadership issues is that the continent has 
enough human capital for leadership, just as she has sufficient 
mineral resources to make her the richest continent, yet she still 
remains poor, and sometimes with visionless leadership, the causes 
and genesis of which have to be questioned. 
 Also, the challenge for Africa is to be able to clearly bargain 
and influence commerce from an independent and well-located 
standpoint, like other regions. This failure has reduced Africa’s 
socio-political and economic standing to a continent gravely in 
need of both leadership and resources. And so, even the discourse 
of a leadership crisis rides on the same currency and has blurred 
the African realities to the extent of even failing to acknowledge 
Africa’s proud history Africa.1 It is also worth noting that Africa’s 
tyrannical regimes have contributed to this discourse of leadership 
crisis by refusing to relinquish power. 
 This article will further present the thesis that the violence 
and dictatorial tendencies seen among most African leaders, while 
rooted, partly, within the modes of African gerontocratic designs, 
are also hinged on the fact of colonial interpellation; that is, 
following the violent colonial system, whose notoriety should be 
 
1Diop, C. A. (1974) The African origin of civilisation: Myth or reality. Chicago: Lawrence 
Hill. 
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credited for some of the structural arrangements that used to 
oppress the masses of Africa and had to be dismantled through 
violent liberation struggles. Therefore, I argue that, the vestigial 
colonial violence gave birth to its negation through structures of 
violence and violent means by which colonialism was dislodged. 
The struggle for liberation became synonymous with a situation 
where the oppressed elite challenged the colonial elite to remove 
their shoes for them to simply wear them and continue with all the 
inherited structures of colonialism.2 It follows that the citizens who 
had been forced to exist under the yoke of colonialism, and only 
knew and understood the language of violence, found themselves 
with a new order of violence, honed and polished over the years of 
anti-colonial struggles. Their leadership as a product of society was 
groomed and nurtured through gerontocratic norms and the 
interpellation of violent colonial structures and only knew how to 
govern using spectacles inherited from colonialism. The dictatorial 
leadership that most of Africa now knows is the total summation 
of the Africa’s colonial past conflated with Global imperial 
designs. This situation as a challenge of colonial antinomies tips 
the future of African leadership to continue hanging in the 
balance. What is worse is how the untouchable current crop of 
African leaders have polished and abused state security systems as 
structures for violently oppressing their citizens. As opposed to the 
Global West where violent oppression is exported, in Africa it is 
endogamous and is often imparted on the supposed citizens of the 
state; thus, giving impetus to the regeneration of a violent 
emergent crop of leaders. 
 However, it has been observed that while all these relics of 
colonialism continue to exist, Botswana has managed to present a 
slightly different face and mode of leadership; that is, the way it 
 
2Ake, C. (2000) The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. 
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conducts its politics and, partly, its leadership style. Given these 
differences, questions will be raised in a bid to understand the 
causal links to Botswana’s continued presentation as the citadel of 
democracy and the difference with other African states. 
Furthermore, the notion of Botswana being a democracy together 
with her leadership being presented as democratic will be 
interrogated using the theses of ‘authoritarian liberalism’ and 
‘radical inequalities’ respectively.3 It must be emphasised from the 
onset that while the democratic envelop remains a very desirable 
factor within the African political landscape, it stands externally 
motivated and defined. In other words, the external motivation of 
such a discourse continues to encourage arguments of bias and 
neo-colonialism. Of course, the fact of human rights records, 
constitutionalism, low levels of corruption, the holding of 
intermittent elections, and having clearly defined terms of office 
are some of the ‘necessary’ ingredients too, but we may want to 
acknowledge that the definition of key indices to determine 
democratic credentials remain too steeped towards external 
motivation. By implication, if any African state decides to oppose 
these Global imperial designs, possibilities of it being considered 
as recalcitrant and undemocratic also arise. These challenges have 
skewed the general perspective of Africa’s leadership.  
 Furthermore, it can be argued that Africa’s leadership, even 
the second and third generation, are products of external 
machinations. Examples here would include Mobutu Sese Seko 
who ruled Zaire (now, the Democratic Republic of Congo) for 
 
3  Good, K. (1999) ‘Enduring elite democracy in Botswana.’ Democratization 
Vol. 6.1: 50–66. Se also, Good, K. (1992) ‘Interpreting the exceptionality of 
Botswana.’ Journal of Modern African Studies 30.1: 69–95 (March). 
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thirty-two years with the support of the Global West,4 with his 
dictatorial tendencies known and often ignored as long as he 
fulfilled certain external interests. It also emerged later that Zaire 
had, during Mobutu’s time, ratified the highest number of 
international legal instruments than most African countries, 
including very important human rights instruments, simply to 
impress the Global West. However, Mobutu’s human rights record 
and corrupt tendencies remained a known fact. The same can be 
said of Zimbabwe, as aptly captured by Davd Lamb (1987) and 
Dinizulu Macaphulana (2010) in their presentation of Mugabe’s 
close relationship with the British establishment in the 1980s.5 
 Botswana, however, emerges differently in its human rights 
record, despite the Basarwa issue, which has been around for a 
while.6 Botswana’s democratic credentials, unlike other African 
states, are further supported by the fact of their different handling 
of political opposition parties; that is, instead of harassing, 
intimidating and arresting political opponents, they simply buy 
them out of opposition, thereby weakening them. The culture of 
buying political opponents can be traced as far back as the era of 
its founding fathers, especially through the use of traditional 
powers derived through ascriptive ways. The current president, 
Seretse Khama Ian Khama, corroborated the latter in his remarks 
while addressing supporters of the ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) in Francistown on 3 May 2010 regarding the split and 
 
4  Refer to French, H. W. (1997) ‘Anatomy of an Autocracy: Mobutu’s 32 year reign.’ 
Found in: http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/051797zaire-mobutu.html 
(accessed: 12 March 2013). 
5Dinizulu Macapulana’s paper titled: ‘Mugabe, Tsvangirai: UK’s ‘men in Harare.’ The 
paper can be accessed on the following link: http://www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion-
2361-Curse+of+the+UKs+men+in+Harare/opinion.aspx 
6Good, K. (1992) ‘Interpreting the exceptionality of Botswana.’ Journal of Modern 
African Studies 30.1: 69–95 (March). 
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challenges he was facing that: ‘I am a president and a paramount 
chief; I don’t need a faction.’7 
 Botswana, however, like any other African state, cannot be 
left out of the discourse of the failure of the post-colonial African 
national project, in particular the leadership issues. Nonetheless, 
through the former president, Sir Quette Ketumile Masire, 
Botswana, the state whose politics have not been critically assessed 
within the rigours of a much-nuanced scholarship, will be 
presented under the temporary microscope in the following 
sections. It will also be argued that, while it is generally accepted 
that Sir Ketumile Masire was officially in office as president for 18 
years, he also had another two years in which he was managing the 
presidential wheel from the sidelines during the first phase of 
President Festus Gontebanye Mogae’s turn up to 2000.8 Masire 
now basks in the glory of being an elder statesman and is a 
member of the Global Leadership Coalition and the African 
Forum. He is also credited for establishing and actively leading the 
organisation of Frontline States, and then engineering its 
transformation and ultimately the formation of the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which 
he chaired for 16 years. He was also at the helm of SADCC’s 
transformation from a regional ‘coordinating conference’ to a 
regional development-focused body in which the spirit of 
collective community ownership is being celebrated, and the desire 
 
7 More information on this issue can be obtained on the following website: 
http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20100503&i=Resign_from_parliament_-
_Khama 
8 This information was obtained through the interview the author had with Sir 
Ketumile Masire on 12 March 2010, in which he confirmed that he was literally in power 
for 20 years, with the last two having been set aside for him to take Mr. Mogae through 
the leadership ropes. While this may be understood in other terms by the very 
imaginative, it also presents another interesting dimension in Botswana’s leadership style 
– the aspect of leadership grooming. 
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to find lasting pan-African development solutions in the post-
colonial era is strong. 
 During his presidency, Masire played a pivotal role in 
Zimbabwe, for example in his continued communication with the 
Zimbabwean leadership and in providing refuge to thousands of 
Ndebele refugees fleeing the Gukurahundi genocide in the 1980s.9 
Upon retirement, Masire led and participated in a number of peace 
mediation efforts. These include leading the negotiations between 
warring parties in the DRC, the crisis in Lesotho, and the recent 
attempts to neutralise the course of events between the monarchy 
and the political space in Swaziland. In view of all these efforts, Sir 
Quett Ketumile Masire views himself as a ‘political fire-brigade.’10 
 However, before turning to the challenges of the post-Seretse 
Khama era and the waning euphoria of the independence period, 
let us look at the ideological positions that most of the founding 
leaders of Africa found themselves in.  
 
AFRICA’S POST-COLONIAL ORDERS AND THEIR IDEOLOGICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Any attempt to conceptualise Africa’s historical challenges in a bid 
to conjecture on futuristic projections cannot be considered 
enough without seeking to understand the ideological summations 
upon which most African nation-states were founded. Also, given 
 
9 Information on this was obtained from some of the previously declassified 
documents now found in the Botswana National Archives. The most notable ones are 
when he created a delegation which constantly met with their counterparts from 
Zimbabwe to discuss the killings that were taking place in Matabeleland. At some point 
he was under pressure to hand some of the former members of ZAPU to the 
Zimbabwean authorities, which he declined to do. Then another letter dated 15 July, 
1983 addressed to the then Zimbabwean Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, confirms 
Masire’s communication and participation in seeking a solution to the issue of the 
Gukurahundi genocide. 
10 This quote was taken from the transcript of the interview the author had with Sir 
Masire in March 2010. 
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that the era of the late 1950s to the late 1980s was marked by 
radical pro-liberation shifts, a need arises to try to understand the 
continent as a way of emerging with a grounded theory on its 
leadership. It is on that note, therefore, that post-colonial 
ideological orders of signification become important.  
 And so we must quickly observe that Africa’s first-generation 
leaders depicted certain monarchical tendencies, partly because of 
their failure to cause an interlock between the indigenous 
leadership paradigms and their political offices. This failure in 
most cases was also evidenced in the citizens’ often exuberant 
discourses, in which they failed to understand the shifts from the 
pre-colonial paradigmatic orders of leadership. These leaders were 
assigned those roles by ascription to the new political order 
whereby a leader had to be elected. This failure to interlock the 
two paradigms –that is, the indigenous and the modernised 
paradigm – often led to the constant canonisation and reification 
of leaders, in most cases by the ethnic communities from which 
they came. For example, Seretse Khama, the founding father of 
Botswana’s nationalism and the first president, was an heir to the 
Bangwato throne – one of Botswana’s largest nations.11 As a result, 
his transformation into the role of head of the entire state of 
Botswana instead of only the Bangwato also posed a challenge to 
other ethnic groups within the state, in particular those who had 
often had ethnic rifts with the Bangwato group. The daunting 
challenge was for Africa to develop a new image,12 which had to be 
carried within the contours of ideology as a way of catching up.13 
Most first-generation leaders faced a challenge as they departed 
from the indigenous models that most of them considered 
backward and saw no need to integrate them into their modernised 
 
11Williams 2007: 3. 
12Ayittey 2000: passim. 
13 Nkrumah 1973: 401. 
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political structures. As a result, strong intellectualised ideologies, 
most of them with a Westernised import, were coined.  
 A slight detour into these ideologies would illuminate this 
discussion. Four ideological positions emerge here,14 the first being 
socialism, which was practised in different versions by the likes of 
Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda. The main 
threat to this was the attempt to create an egalitarian society, with 
the state being the mechanism of attaining it. Second, the ideology 
of ‘political pragmatism,’ with its prime movers being Felix 
Houphouet-Boigny, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda and Daniel Arap Moi. The premise of this ideology was the 
declaration by its proponents as ‘non-ideological’, but pitched 
economic growth and prosperity as their key goals. This pragmatic 
worldview was quite statist and not different from the populist 
socialist views, but was, however, advanced for different reasons, 
mostly for the preservation of elite privileges. Their notion of 
centralisation was ‘delineated not in a social or political way but in 
an administrative sense. It nevertheless was as deeply ensconced in 
the political attitudes of pragmatists as in those of self-proclaimed 
socialists.15 
 Then military nationalism became the third ideology. This 
ideology was ‘supplied by the first batch of military leaders who 
burst onto the political scene in the late 1960s and early 1970s.’16 
These leaders were clearly dictatorial, and included the likes of Idi 
Amin, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Mobutu Sese Seko and Gnassingbe 
Eyadema. Most of their major challenges were that they were not 
central to the dislodging of colonialism, and so their mindsets were 
often influenced by the insecurities and inadequacies of seeing 
 
14Ayittey ibid. See also Chazan, N. et al. 1992: passim. 
15Chazan et al.: Op cit: 156. 
16Ayittey: ibid. 
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themselves as not being entirely accepted due to their lack of 
contribution to the liberation struggles in their countries. They 
therefore exercised full control of national resources and 
encouraged statist monopolies. These leaders were ‘bereft of 
intellectual content’ and ‘replete with contradictions;’ thus with a 
tendency to address key issues haphazardly, often to exercise their 
brute force.17 
 Then Afro-Marxism became the fourth ideology, which 
became the official state policy for countries like Angola, 
Mozambique during Samora Machel’s time, and the Congo during 
Fulbert Youlou’s time, then later transferred to socialism 
(commonly referred to as ‘scientific socialism’) during Alphonse 
Massamba-Debat’s reign, and again returning to Afro-Marxism 
during Denis Sassou Nguessou’s early years in office. In Ethiopia, 
Afro-Marxism became the official state policy during Mengistu 
Haile Mariam’s reign. It has been observed that Afro-Marxism, 
 
 . . . attributed the malaise of African economies to 
the lingering effects of imperialism and the 
continuing machinations of neo-colonialism, both 
within and outside Africa. It envisaged the creation 
of a totally new social order, in which private 
ownership of the means of production would be 
abolished and the state would become the supreme 
patron of economic destiny.18 
 
While these ideologies were known for their strong prime movers, 
in terms of the leading figures that purveyed them, they were not 
cast in stone. And so states could shift from different ones 
 
17Chazan et al.: Op cit: 158. 
18Ayittey: Op cit: 60. 
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depending on the leadership at the time. However, it was very 
common that the leadership often stayed in power for a much 
longer period, as seen in the case of most founding fathers of 
Africa. Some of them had to be forcibly removed from power by 
irritated masses, as happened with Nkrumah in Ghana, while 
others left through death’s door, as happened with Seretse Khama. 
In the case of Botswana, however, a slightly different political 
project was coined as part of state policy, one that was different 
from most African states. The new political leadership embarked 
on a much more traditionalised system of local government in 
which chiefs controlled powers through a traditional court or 
kgotla. Masire’s rise to power did not mark a sharp departure from 
Khama’s policies. Masire somehow vacillated between the second 
ideology of ‘political pragmatism’ and that of ‘authoritarian 
liberalism’ dressed in the respectable garb of ‘social democracy.’ As 
stated above, he considers himself to be a ‘political fire-brigade,’19 a 
position which he says firmly locates him within the ambit of 
social democracy. This is aptly captured in his book, Very brave or 
very foolish: Memoirs of an African democrat20 and further corroborated 
by Susan Williams in her book: Colour bar: The triumph of Seretse 
Khama and his nation.21 
 As part of his residual policy agenda, Masire is credited for 
working closely with Khama to create a viable economic structure 
for the young state of Botswana at the time, but one that was 
partly hinged on the traditional leadership systems while at the 
same time disparaging it in favour of the new elite approach, 
probably for its economic trappings. And so a villagised elite 
emerged, which captured the state and placed animal husbandry at 
 
19Masire, Q. K. J. (2006) Very brave or very foolish: Memoirs of an African democrat. 
Gaborone: Macmillan. 
20ibid. 
21Williams, S. ibid. 
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the core of agricultural activities while acting as a political 
footstool for the political elite, which is also very tribalised and 
traditionalised. As a result, during Masire’s time Botswana emerged 
as a state that had been captured by former traditional cattle 
farmers. Cattle rearing is the activity that most Batswana continue 
to be involved in, and one which forms the gist of their agricultural 
activities.22 
 
SIR QUETT KETUMILE JONI MASIRE: FOUNDING LEADER AND 
STATESMAN 
It is often a big challenge to attempt to offer a brief background of 
a leader who was in office for almost two decades. In case some 
critics assume the choice of defining him as inappropriate, it is 
worth highlighting from the outset that part of this attempt to 
understand Masire, the man, his works and political life is a 
product of my direct engagement with him, and also the author’s 
own analysis as a result of his engagement with different people 
who witnessed Masire’s term in office. Further, in his assessment 
of Masire’s leadership the author has tended to view his leadership 
as part of a collective approach; and is informed by the wisdom 
that a leader is a servant of many. This, at least, is the dictum in 
most African societies, and it certainly is among the Batswana.  
 Ketumile Masire was born on 23 July 1925, among the 
Bangwaketse people in the town called Kanye. He was the first child 
of Joni Masire and Gabaipone. The surname ‘Masire’ means ‘the 
protector,’ shortened from Masira phepho ya borwa, which means 
‘the protector against the cold from the South whose chill gets into 
the marrow of one’s bones.’23 However, the irony is the 
coincidence of the name ‘Masire’ and the circumstances its 
 
22Good 1992: 77 
23Masire: Op cit: 01. 
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beholder found himself in later – that is, being the son of a 
headman with an influential position in the village, and going on to 
become one of the illustrious leaders of Botswana and Southern 
Africa, and of Africa’s elder statesman. As such, his name deserves 
to be placed within its rightful historical context - the name 
‘Ketumile’ means ‘I am well known.’ 
 In his book he presents a cartoon of Botswana allegorised as 
a helpless malnourished child left in the bush surrounded by wild 
animals and snakes taken from the Punch magazine (3 August 1966: 
169), depicting the political climate he had to protect his people 
from, as a symbolic reference to his name. Further, the cartoon 
presents the disjunctures caused by a departing British coloniser 
who merely deserts a helpless Botswana, in the middle of the bush 
and surrounded by hostile colonial states in the period 1964/5. 
Masire presents these as the challenges that a newly independent 
state had to face, being amidst hostile and firmly colonised, rabidly 
racists states like apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe), and South-West Africa (now Namibia). 
 Masire considers himself and others who agitated and 
demanded independence from the British colonisers to have been 
‘very brave.’24 Also, during an interview with him, he stated that 
‘most people often referred to us as very foolish for daring the 
British and demanding independence in the midst of very hostile 
colonial states that surrounded us.’ But the general prelude to the 
background of one of Botswana’s illustrious sons makes it clear 
that Quett Ketumile Masire’s names were a prophecy to the 
leadership positions that would later be part of his life, 
notwithstanding the loss of his parents at the age of 21 and having 
to assume the position of breadwinner at a young age. These 
unfortunate circumstances even forced him to temporarily shift 
 
24ibid: 30ff. 
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the course direction of his life and plans, as he had to venture into 
teacher training instead of studying directly towards a BSc degree 
in Agriculture. He eventually completed his teacher training in 
1949 at Tiger Kloof and became the headmaster of the new Kanye 
Junior Secondary School. It was around that time that he also 
trained as a journalist with the Trans-Africa Correspondence 
College. Then in 1958 he became the key leader and editor of the 
Africa Echo and the new Naledi ya Batswana. His interest in 
journalism took him to the echelons of Therisanyo (Consultation), the 
mouthpiece of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party, which was 
later transformed into Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), and has 
been the current ruling party ever since. It was then that Masire 
was able to drive the party’s engine whose task was to play the role 
of political re-awakening.  
 Masire rose from being the editor of the party’s main 
information-churning engine, Therisanyo, to the position of 
secretary-general of the party, and was then catapulted to the vice-
presidency from 1966 to 1980. Following the death of Sir Seretse 
Khama in 1980, he assumed the presidency, a position he held 
until his retirement in 1998.25 While this is a short-circuited version 
of the otherwise very long, eventful and illustrious career of Quett 
Ketumile Joni Masire, it does provide some information on the 
man he later became – a global statesman.  
 On the domestic scene, Masire prides himself of being the 
visionary steward who led a peaceful nationstate with very hostile 
neighbours still reeling under the colonial yoke – Namibia and 
South Africa. The World Bank placed Botswana’s real income per 
capita growth rate as the highest during Masire’s term of office; 
thus making it one of the highest ever reached by one of the 
countries of the Global South from 1965 to 1999. Transparency 
 
25Williams ibid. 
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International also ranked Botswana as having the lowest level of 
corruption in Africa, and it also has a celebrated history of holding 
multiparty elections, first in 1965 and 1969, and thereafter every 
five years. Owing to Botswana’s economic stability and peace, the 
country became the steward of the Frontline States, an 
organisation that provided diplomatic assistance and other services 
to the liberation movements. Botswana further led the 
establishment of the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) and its ultimate transformation to Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). 
 In 1981, Botswana was affected by drought, which was to last 
for a period of almost seven years, the driest of all being 1983 and 
1984. It was then that the programme of cattle improvement 
became suffocated. However, this crisis provided Masire with an 
opportunity to plan for the future by refining the country’s famine 
relief programme. Masire says he achieved this by instituting a new 
labour-based relief scheme in which villages and district councils 
came up with projects such as road building, dam construction and 
land clearing.26 Locals would be employed in these projects for a 
few months, payment for which was sufficient to sustain them 
during the famine. The success of this programme earned praise 
for Masire’s leadership, and even an award of US$100 000, which 
he shared with Burkina Faso. 
 Masire, working with Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and 
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, was instrumental in coining the term 
‘Frontline States’ in the mid-1960s to the 1970s and its leadership. 
In emphasising his role, he adds: ‘I’ve been told I was the one who 
coined the name “Frontline States” for the group.’27 In 1980 
Masire’s leadership became even more instrumental within the 
 
26Masire ibid. 
27ibid: 275 
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southern African region leading to the formation of the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) for 
which Masire took the mantle of chairmanship. Thus he adds, 
‘during the early 1980s, Botswana provided the lion’s share of 
leadership and staff for SADCC.’28 This organisation was formed 
mainly with a task to encourage trade and development among 
newly independent regional member states. While it had the 
economic side to focus on, as a solidarity grouping of states, it 
sought to escalate efforts to help in the liberation efforts in other 
countries like Namibia and South Africa. However, while the 
SADCC embarked on these efforts through the able stewardship 
of Masire, confrontational engagement with apartheid South Africa 
was avoided, thus showing Masire’s ways of engaging in soft 
diplomacy as a ‘political fire-brigade.’ He claims that this was due 
to the different regional obligations he had and being mindful of 
the challenges at home, in particular, the ripple effects of 
diplomatic efforts in the region and how they could ricochet, and 
end-up affecting the citizens of Botswana. As a result, Botswana 
traded with South Africa, although on a reduced scale, but it is 
reported that although only half of Botswana’s regional overseas 
trade had passed though South Africa around 1981, the figure had 
increased to around 85 per cent by 1985.29 
 The challenge of trade routes, considering that Botswana is a 
landlocked country, had dealt a big blow to her diplomatic position 
towards apartheid South Africa, thus requiring a strategic 
mastering of relations. This meant that while Botswana still 
harboured and continued to support South Africa’s liberation 
fighters and their efforts, in the open the leadership of Botswana 
 
28ibid: 276 
29 For more information on this, please refer to the following article: Wolf, G. (1994) 
‘Masire, Quett 1925 President of Botswana.’ Contemporary Black Biography. Michigan: 
Thomas Gale Publishers. 
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had to discourage any violent tactics employed from their borders 
as attempts to liberate South Africa. However, as Masire puts it, 
this position was reached after weighing all options.30 
 
MAPPING BOTSWANA’S CULTURAL COMPLEXITIES AND THE 
POLITICS OF MARGINALITY 
Botswana, an Anglophone country, presents an interesting case of 
state capture like most other southern African nation-states. First, 
like most African states, there exists a system of ethnic coercion, 
with the leadership style and its continued influence on the social 
etiquette clearly rooted in the traditional way of life. As stated 
above, the state was captured by traditionalists who, while they are 
into cattle rearing and other forms of economic activity, place 
more emphasis on traditional forms of life that are encapsulated in 
the spirit of ubuntu or botho. To further buttress this position, it is 
worth noting that, to date, Masire, one of the longest-serving 
leaders in the region, is still hailed as a successful farmer. He even 
attests that he is one of the successful farmers and that he was 
born into that farming system.31 It must be added that Sir Seretse 
Khama, the first president of Botswana, also a traditional 
paramount chief of the Bangwato, was a farmer.32 Furthermore, 
Botswana still grants certain legal duties to traditional chiefs and 
the powers to run traditional or customary courts commonly 
known as kgotla.33 Even more interesting is the fact that 
Botswana’s fourth president, Khama Ian Khama, continues to 
emphasise some of the values as espoused in the traditional 
 
30 This information was obtained during the author’s interview with Sir Quett 
Ketumile Masire in March 2010. He was very open and candid on this and many other 
issues.  
31 Masire ibid. 
32Williams ibid. 
33Boko, D. G. (2000) ‘Fair trial and the customary courts in Botswana: Questions on 
legal representation.’ Criminal Law Forum Vol. 11.4: 445–460. 
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teachings through his ‘four Ds’: ‘democracy, development, dignity 
and discipline.’34 Emphasis is placed on discipline and dignity, 
while democracy continues to be used loosely as a general 
catchphrase.  
 State capture by the traditionalised elite has continued to 
influence Botswana’s politics and economic trends. However, 
while the traditional systems are encouraged, especially the kgotla, 
as legal institutions with different ethnic chiefs playing central 
roles, ethnicity is the much-feared factor in Botswana’s nationalist 
politics in the same way as it is feared and criminalised elsewhere 
in Africa, thus making Botswana’s leadership style not different 
from the rest of Africa in many ways. It is clear that the reasons 
for all this are in defence of Botswana’s nationalism, thereby 
presenting another case of a ‘patrimonial autocracy,’35 but 
Botswana’s ethnic composition is diverse and quite complex, and 
definitely not composed of a single ethnic group as others have 
wrongly suggested.36 The state is characterised by a wide array of 
ethnic groups that include baNgwato, baKgatla, baTawana, baKwena, 
baKalanga, baSarwa, baKgalagadi, baBirwa and baHerero, to mention 
but a few. There are more than 26 other languages spoken in the 
country, from which 11 have been identified as belonging to the 
Basarwa linguistic group and completely different from seTswana.37 
 
34 For more information on this, please visit the state of the nation address by His 
Excellency Lt General Seretse Khama Ian Khama, President of the Republic of 
Botswana, to the Opening of the Fifth Session of the Ninth Parliament on ‘Empowering 
the nation through democracy, development, dignity and discipline.’ 
35Hodgkin 1961. See also; Wallerstein 1960 and Young 1997: 4–14. 
36Dowden 2009: 53. 
37Information on the case of Botswana’s multicultural and multilingual nature was 
obtained from the United Nations Economic and Social Council report (2005). This was 
on the right to education, and was compiled by the special rapporteur, Vernor Muñoz: 
Mission to Botswana (26 September to 4 October 2005). The report can be accessed on 
the following website: http://www.universalhumanrightsindex.org/documents/838/842 
/document/en/text.html 
112   AFRICAN JOURNAL OF RHETORIC VOL. 7 
 
©  AFRICAN JOURNAL OF RHETORIC    ISSN  1988-2054  VOLUME 7 2015    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, according to the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council report Botswana’s linguistic situation ‘can be described as 
moderately complex’ – a euphemism for ‘colossal and confusing.’38 
The complexities referred to herein are due to the tacit behaviour 
as encouraged by the leadership alongside their nationalist ethos in 
presenting seTswana as the only language spoken, even by other 
ethnic groups. 
 The linguistic composition of Botswana as a nation-state 
provides a case of the politics of identity transformation and ethnic 
coercion following the power of the state and in particular the 
media as a tool that caters for the hegemonic nature of this form 
of nationalism.39 This ‘received’ and constructed identity is 
commonly known as being a Motswana and has transcended 
various phases of acceptance. It has now shifted from being a 
cultural identity to a form of traditionalised identity, as it is also 
seen as a form of professing patriotism. The latter presents an 
example of postcolonial ‘prebendal politics,’40 with its roots hinged 
on some form of patrimonial autocracy–a situation where the 
elected leadership profess being ‘people driven’ but ends up 
patronising the electorate. In the case of Masire’s leadership, which 
was traditionalised and inherited from Seretse Khama, a traditional 
kgosi (‘paramount chief’), prebendal politics became a common 
feature. At the core of Masire’s political leadership were cultural 
 
38 ibid: 06 
39 This critique was taken from an analysis given by a colleague and friend, Dr 
Sethunya Mosime, University of Botswana, who is also a Mostwana by political identity 
and a Kalanga by ethnic identity and belonging. In her assessment of the case of 
Botswana, she could only describe it as one of Africa’s manifest cases of the politics of 
ethnic accommodation which serves as a form of social re-engineering clustered in the 
cause for belonging. 
40Mbembe, A., (1992) ‘Provisional notes on the postcolony.’ Africa: Journal of 
International Institute 62.1: 3–37. See also, Mbembe, A. (2001) On the Postcolony. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
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values that often explained and rationalised elite clusters coupled 
with deference.41 Thus confirming the state of ‘elite democracy’ in 
a state captured by ‘cattle-barons’ and also reinforcing the 
Weberian concept of legitimation in which the ‘law of the small 
numbers’ matters.42 
 In Botswana when one reaches eighteen years they are 
allowed to apply for a national identity card, commonly referred to 
as an omang in SeTswana,43 which means ‘who are you?’ At the 
back of their national identity card a political identity of being a 
Motswana is then prescribed as a response to the omang question. 
This form of identity acts as a notch of patriotism and also 
affirmation of belonging and being a citizen of Botswana as a state. 
There is no clear explanation on how this identity was arrived at, 
but it has become common knowledge that people from Botswana 
identify with it as a way of expressing their citizenship and 
patriotism. When asked, they are quick to identify themselves by 
saying: ke Motswana, which means, ‘I am a Motswana.’ This identity 
is stated for everyone even though they may be Kalanga, Herero or 
Mosarwa, etc. 
 Botswana, like other African countries, presents a striking 
case of state formation through coercion where other ethnic 
groups had to be pressured by the ruling elite to accept a form of 
 
41Good 1999: ibid.   
42 Refer to Good, K.: ibid. and also, Good, K. (1992) ‘Interpreting the 
exceptionality of Botswana.’ Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 30.1: 69–95 
(March). Good, K. (1996) ‘Popular participation in Botswana.’ Journal of Modern 
African Studies Vol. 34.1: 53–77. 
43This information was obtained from colleagues at the University of Botswana in 
March 2009 during my field. It was later confirmed by another Motswana colleague in 
March 2012.  
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identity that has remained fictitious to this day.44 When critically 
analysed this case mirrors Botswana’s leadership style and ethos. 
 
CHALLENGES AND FAILURES OF MASIRE’S LEADERSHIP 
Many of the older generations saw Masire as corrupt in the way 
that he often took advantage of government resources for personal 
projects such as his farms. Along with some big local farmers, at 
some point he had loans from the National Development Bank 
written off, an issue which attracted vitriolic criticisms, but as 
stated above, Masire has to be understood within the spectacles of 
the epoch he was in office – when Seretse Khama died, with the 
euphoria of independence beginning to die down, but with the 
diamond boom which had just started. As a result, Masire in many 
ways ushered the first wave of Botswana’s liberalism. And was 
successful in managing the diamond boom with minimum 
corruption and sound financial planning. 
 However, due to his welfarist and rural development policies, 
especially poverty alleviation and agricultural policies started by 
Seretse Khama, Masire is often blamed for perpetuating the 
dependency of the masses on the state, thereby killing the spirit of 
ipelegeng – self-reliance. Further, it is argued that through a project 
under the banner of the Accelerated Rural Development 
Programme (ARDP), approved by cabinet in November 1973 
more focus was on the provision of infrastructure and ‘basic needs 
in the countryside rather than direct encouragement of production 
there.’45 As a result, the state ended up preferring to further certain 
projects due to their visibility as a way of harnessing political 
capital during election time, and with more resources allocated to 
 
44Saugestad, S. (2001) The inconvenient indigenous: Remote area development in Botswana, donor 
assistance, and the first people of the Kalahari. Uppsala: NORDISKA Afrikainstitutet. 
45 Good 1992: 77.  
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the livestock sector. By 1982-6 domestic cereal production was as 
low as 10 percent of the domestic requirement.46 
 However, compared to his predecessor, Seretse Khama, who 
to most people featured prominently as a ‘Mosaic’ leader given his 
traditional role as a kgosi, Masire emerges as the most important 
leader in Botswana’s early period of independence. He stands out 
as a ‘managerial’ leader. Compared to Festus Mogae, he was more 
conservative and risk averse in terms of taking economic risks that 
could have boosted diversification of Botswana’s economy –that 
is, if one is to take neo-liberalism as a good thing. He is credited 
for formulating policies that were later embraced by successive 
leaders regarding the mining and marketing of diamonds. One 
research participant added that ‘Masire could also have more 
aggressively demanded diamond beneficiation earlier’47 than having 
to leave it to successive generations. He was also a kind of 
moralist, and was slower than Mogae in driving HIV/AIDS related 
projects, an accusation he accepts by saying: 
 
During my time in office, our failure to deal with 
HIV/AIDS in an effective way in the early days of 
the disease arose from judgemental errors. It is one 
of those I wish I had handled differently, and it is 
perhaps my greatest regret. The pandemic is now 
threatening to destroy so much of what we have 
accomplished, economically, socially and politically.48 
 
Furthermore, Masire’s major criticism, as already stated above, 
directly feeds into Kenneth Good’s thesis on ‘elite democracy’ or 
 
46 ibid. 
47 This said raised by one of my research participants in July 2012.  
48 Masire Op cit.: 237 
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‘authoritarian liberalism’. And to capture this scenario, Good 
further argues:  
 
[t]he president of Botswana is not elected directly by 
the people but is chosen from among the members 
of parliament, an electorate which has averaged in 
size around 35 people. Presidential candidates are 
not required to run for parliamentary election, but 
the President nonetheless becomes an ex-officio 
member of parliament with the right to speak and 
vote in parliament.49 
 
As a result, Kenneth Good writing during Masire’s time in office 
warned that Botswana had long been viewed as a ‘shining light’ of 
democracy in southern Africa but with a predominant party 
system, where extensive powers were concentrated in the hands of 
a presidency that was not directly elected by the people and with a 
record of official discouragement of free expression, thereby 
causing a weak executive accountability. Masire was also often 
accused of trivialising ordinary people’s concerns by providing less 
than useful responses to their concerns. Another respondent 
narrated a story of how people often complained about Masire’s 
responses whenever he was challenged; ‘. . . he would tell an old 
man complaining about poverty that he was surprised at the 
amount of human dung that his convoy had to negotiate, so that 
to him was a sign that people must be having plenty to eat.’50 Most 
people seemed to find these off-hand remarks lacking in taste.  
 This failure of communication between the executive and 
ordinary citizens further led to deep inequalities of property and 
 
49Good 1999: 51. 
50Information on Masire’s responses to challenges by people in the villages was 
obtained from one research participant in August 2012.  
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income,51 an issue that posed more problems for Mogae’s 
leadership. Good therefore saw Masire’s system as a form of 
democracy restricted to the legitimising political elites through 
elections, with a marked high-growth economy and its eventual 
accompanying ideology of rewards to those making the biggest 
contributions, with others waiting patiently for their crumbs. This 
approach was influenced by the kind of democracy in which the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) encouraged a ‘predominant-
party system’. 
 During Masire’s time, the predominant-party system 
reinforced elitism and centralised political power.52 As a result the 
executive was shielded from any possible accountability. This non-
accountability of the elite, legitimised by the pre-eminence of the 
presidency and facilitated by the dominance of the governing party 
in parliament, increased the state of elite democracy. Added to the 
extensive presidential privileges that Masire enjoyed was the 
extended term of office in which he led with no term limits 
whatsoever. This process continued until 1998 when amendments 
were effected to the party’s constitution. Further, Masire’s 
government became engrossed in image making and expanded 
military expenditure, which by the 1990s had reached 6 per cent of 
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).  
 It has been further observed that while Botswana during 
Masire’s term had achieved rapid growth with stability since 
independence, largely through interrelations between an open-
market economy and a system of elite democracy,53 another 
underlying factor for the growth and stability was the successful 
blending of traditional or indigenous knowledge and modern 
knowledge systems. Contributing to the economic growth was the 
 
51 Good: ibid. 
52 ibid. 
53 ibid. 
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marked diamond boom, which Masire managed to harness with 
limited corruption. For example, Botswana registered a fast rate of 
economic growth between 1995 and 1996 with per capita income 
averaging 9 800 pula (about US$3 000).54 In 1996/97, economic 
growth achieved was around 6.9 percent, and foreign exchange 
reserves were kept very high with a very low debt–service ratio. 
Diamonds contributed around 80 percent of export revenue.55  
 However, agriculture, which constitutes the major source of 
livelihood for most Batswana, fell to around 3.8 percent of the 
GDP between 1995 and 1996, thus implying that the government 
had contributed around 17 per cent of the GDP, making it the 
country’s largest single employer, with mining accounting for only 
8 400 people by 1996. In view of all these developments, 
Botswana’s paid workforce totalled 234 000, with central and local 
government employment figures pegged at 86 000.56 
Unemployment figures remained high, which Good interpreted as 
the stunting of the development of a working class that could 
invigorate Botswana’s trade union and ultimately assist in pushing 
the democratic envelop. As a result, during Masire’s time Botswana 
enjoyed a small and very constrained civil society, with a largely 
passive parliament made up of members of parliament harbouring 
more self-interests than democratic ideals.  
 
COLONIAL VESTIGES AND THE CONTINUATION OF GLOBAL 
LEADERSHIP CONTRA-FLOWS 
Botswana, unlike most African states, enjoys relative peace and a 
marked form of social, economic and political stability, but it has 
been noted that various other ethnic groups like the Basarwa and 
the Kalanga, for example, continue to register their discontent with 
 
54 Good 1999: ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid: 55  
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the general state of affairs. This is seen partly as a result of 
unfulfilled government promises that have continued to linger 
since independence.57 The birth of Botswana as a state, as was 
naturally the case with most former colonies, followed governance 
systems that had been used by the departing colonial 
administrators. It will also be noted that, as in most other African 
states, even among the independent constitutions that were 
created, most of them tended to be formed following clear 
assurances given at a conference to mark the shift of leadership. 
 For most former British colonies, conferences had to be held 
in Britain as the ‘mother country.’ In the case of Botswana it was 
at Lancaster. Even their constitution like in most postcolonial 
states was handed down to them from the colonial metropolis, 
London, like a book of rules in a ‘suzerain treaty’, - granting 
independence with one hand and taking away its true emancipatory 
meaning with the other, thereby frustrating the actualisation of 
independence in reality. At this juncture it may be necessary to 
further highlight the dearth of critical decolonial literature that 
discusses the lines of delineation between independence, 
emancipation and liberation.  
 From the foregoing it is noteworthy to emphasise that in 
Botswana, like in other African postcolonial states, the vestigial 
colonial antinomies include a centralised system of governance and 
bloated government structure characterised by marked levels of 
bureaucratic constipation. A broader assessment of the entire 
African continent reveals similar traits, thus eliciting a question: If 
most postcolonial states inherited most colonial structures, 
including the social and political infrastructure (like certain laws), 
why then should it be difficult to draw parallels and possibly 
 
57 This information was taken from the author’s interview with Sir Ketumile Masire 
in March 2010. 
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lessons learnt from colonialism in terms of the violent 
dictatorships that continue to dog most African states as part of 
diverse leadership styles? It is also worth noting that these forms 
of inheritance as residual social infrastructure have further 
exacerbated the old colonial stereotypical views about weaker 
ethnic minority groups. In Botswana the case of the Basarwa 
continues to be an albatross hanging around the neck of the state’s 
human rights and development record. By the early 1990s the 
population of the Basarwa, which totalled 30 000, and that of 
14 000 baKgalagadi presented a special case of the radical 
inequalities and disjunctures that continued to dent Botswana’s 
exceptionality in Africa.58 This exceptionality is not because they 
are unique or exotic. Rather it is because they personified among 
the vulnerable groups the actual vagaries of rural capitalism and 
would also show how other groups might go eventually ‘towards 
having no access to resources.’ The Kalanga are also not an 
exception. These developments are due to the fact that the 
departing colonial administrators gave power to the dominant 
ethnic groups, as stated above, with Seretse Khama a clear heir 
apparent of the Bangwato people leading the new independent 
state.59 
 The situation presented above also meant that the new 
leadership, while it inherited the colonial systems of administration 
and governance, it also infused into the new system of governance 
a form of leadership based on the imaginations of the pre-colonial 
arrangements, most of them gerontocratic practices, thereby 
creating a successor state. As a result Botswana during Masire’s 
time witnessed marked levels of traditionalised authoritarianism, 
inherited from Khama, and was masked as deference for cultural 
 
58 Good 1993: 80. For more on this issue, see also: Saugestad 2001: ibid. 
59 For more information on this, ref. Williams ibid.  
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and traditional values, leaders and elders. The latter also add to the 
expanding list of similarities that Botswana has with other African 
states – that is, being partly established as a successor state while at 
the same time having inherited almost everything from the 
departing colonial administrators. This issue will be revisited in the 
discussion later on violence and wild forms of dictatorship as 
colonial antinomies in most African countries. However, it would 
suffice to highlight at this juncture that due to this form of 
leadership style, Botswana inherited two forms: one from the 
colonial administration, and the other from the pre-colonial 
traditional arrangement, which is extremely gerontocratic.  
 Furthermore, Botswana as a state was captured by a 
particularised class and group of people of very marked interests – 
cattle rearing. In addition, most state captors happened to be 
modestly educated. Having said this and given the object of this 
article – African leadership – this thesis on ‘state capture’ to the 
southern African region will be expanded upon, probably to 
arouse further scholarly engagement on the subject. A cursory look 
at leadership within the region would show how various groups of 
people captured their different states. 
 As stated above, in Botswana the state was captured by 
traditional cattle barons who in their practice of cattle rearing have 
tended to influence what one would refer to as Botswana’s socio-
economic and political life. A snippet of regional trends would 
show that in neighbouring South Africa, which controls the 
economic locus of the region, former Robben Island prisoners and 
exiles captured the state. Even the narration of the liberation ethos 
within the corridors of Commissioner Street tends to be 
punctuated with references to life in exile, and Robben Island. 
While these groups might have come from different backgrounds, 
they all had one thing in common – having collectively fought 
against apartheid. In Zimbabwe the state was captured by a group 
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of radicals, most of them intellectuals with a tendency towards a 
particular tribalised ethos – Shona tribalism. In Swaziland 
traditionalists also captured the state. These forms of state capture 
have continued to have an impact on leadership issues within these 
countries as discourses of power continue to be confined within 
these groups. 
 The arguments on state capture presented above provide the 
basis for the argument that Africa neither has a leadership crisis 
nor a leadership deficit. Even to perceive the challenges that Africa 
faces as a result of leadership deficit is to miss the point. Rather, 
the duty of Africa’s academia, present and future, is to interrogate, 
engage and decode those spectacles that have been used to put 
African problems down to offshoots of leadership challenges – 
what has been caricatured in some circles as Africa’s leadership 
crisis.60 Given the challenge of having to decode these spectacles it 
could be argued that Africa, in fact, has an abundance of human 
resources for leadership. However, global forces external to Africa 
that continue to quarry for potential leaders tend to provide a 
major challenge to Africa’s leadership development as they have 
always toed, entrenched and in some cases revived age old colonial 
stencils of leadership grooming. Further, it can be claimed that 
while Africa is not completely divorced from the incessant global 
flows marked by the titanic rise of new media and 
interconnectivity, a need remains for a leadership that is locally 
developed – one that is not influenced by the agendas of big 
business, big foundations or Western-inspired institutions. 
Otherwise this is merely a new form of colonisation of the African 
lifeworlds. It should be acknowledged that the trend of ‘cherry-
picking’ young promising Africans for leadership training 
 
60Bayart, J., Ellis, S. and Hibou, B. (1999) The criminalisation of the state in 
Africa. Oxford: James Currey. 
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programmes is an old practice. As Frantz Fanon trenchantly 
posits: 
 
[t]he European elite undertook to manufacture a 
native elite. They picked out promising adolescents; 
they branded them, as with a red-hot iron, with the 
principles of western culture; they stuffed their 
mouths full with high-sounding phrases, grand 
glutinous words that stuck to the teeth. After a short 
stay in the mother country they were sent home, 
white-washed. These walking lies had nothing left to 
say to their brothers; they only echoed.61 
 
While the trend has been an ongoing challenge for Africa’s home-
grown arrangements to counter it, this has been continuing 
unabated, given the global phenomenon of new interconnections 
emanating from the widespread use of information 
communication technologies. Indeed, it should also be celebrated 
for its advantages in that the product might be a broadminded 
person, as the African adage has it that ‘travelling broadens the 
mind’. However, its discontents deserve to be unmasked. There is 
a yawning gap for academics, researchers and policymakers to 
investigate. It is here that Africa’s future leadership gets distorted 
in that the process of elite manufacture tends to present a 
leadership, which is marginal and one-dimensionally minded. 
Again, the models used tend not to be any different from the old 
ones used during colonialism. The modest difference is that this 
time around the new prospective leaders are treated as ‘equals’ 
amid often patronising activities and showered with praises, then 
dispatched back to Africa as chirped servants of global imperial 
 
61Fanon 1968: iv.  
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designs. But the underlying factor is that they receive invitations 
and nominations to be part of what is always aptly captured as the 
global leadership ethos. However, the latter, if deeply interrogated, 
presents a further Westernised neo-colonial leadership ethos 
whose semiology remains hinged on Western depictions of ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ leadership, its episteme and philosophy. In these 
depictions, case studies of bad leaders are usually presented as 
African leaders, past and present. But what is not further espoused 
is that from the first to the third generation of Africa’s leaders, all 
of them were products of Western or these institutions in one way 
or another.  
 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it can be gleaned that in most African states, 
leadership continues to come from ‘dominant’ ethnic groups. This 
then poses a challenge in terms of harnessing the diverse human 
resources at the disposal of the continent, but it does not translate 
into leadership deficit. Further, a closer analysis of the Botswana 
situation as a complex case of both promise and inequalities 
presents, on the one hand, a positive outlook whose value can 
translate into lessons to learn, while on the other hand there are 
glaring ideological shifts that project Botswana as a state with 
marked ‘authoritarian liberalism’ and more influence from the 
Global West. The latter becomes evident when analysing Masire’s 
liberal capitalistic policies and the attendant inequalities seen in the 
case of the Basarwa who continue to be an albatross to Botswana’s 
exceptionality. Further, it can be concluded that Western-
sponsored foundations and leadership institutions that placate 
young Africans from their societies for leadership training firmly 
located within Western paradigms continue to conjure global 
imperial designs of identifying potential leadership from dominant 
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ethnic groups, thereby not helping the continent to develop 
beyond capture by small ethnic-inclined cliques. 
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